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Abstract  
I conduct a laboratory experiment to analyse the effect of deadlines and deadline length on 
charitable giving. Individuals may postpone or procrastinate making a donation, and then 
forget about doing so due to inattention. This behavioural problem is called inertia. In other 
contexts, deadlines are a useful tool to prevent inertia. I examine their use in the context of 
charitable giving using a dictator game where the recipient is a local charity. Participants are 
either constrained by a one week deadline, a two week deadline, or no deadline. I find no 
statistically significant evidence of an inertia effect in charitable giving. Furthermore, I find 
no evidence that the use of a deadline increases the number of donations, or the average 
donation of participants. The length of the deadline does not change this result. Examining 
positive donations, there is a significantly higher average donation with the use of a two week 
deadline compared to no deadline, but this result does not carry through to other comparisons. 
Overall, I find that deadlines do not appear to help, nor hinder, charitable campaigns. 
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1. Introduction 
Many individuals are familiar with the behavioural problem of procrastination. We often 
delay tasks in our daily lives, especially if they are unpleasant. This generally has no impact 
on others: we delay, we hurry to finish the task, but ultimately it gets done. This is especially 
true if there is a deadline by which the action must be completed. However, what happens if 
this procrastination problem also affects charitable giving? In this case the procrastination 
problem no longer affects only the individual decision-maker, but also the charity and their 
beneficiaries. Despite making the decision to donate, individuals may postpone making the 
donation until a time when they are less busy. Having delayed once, they may do so again 
until eventually the decision to donate is forgotten. Constant procrastination, leading to failure 
to complete the task, is called inertia. This could have a negative impact on revenue for 
charities, so it is important to examine whether this issue does indeed exist and find ways to 
counter it if necessary. One of the primary ways in which inertia is overcome in other 
situations is with the presence of a deadline. In this study, I look at whether donors are 
affected by an inertia problem through a laboratory experiment examining charitable 
behaviour with and without deadlines. Secondly, I investigate whether changing the length of 
a deadline influences donation behaviour, with the hope of finding an optimal deadline length. 
Many charities already use deadlines in their campaigns, including PETA and the 
Christchurch Transitional Architecture Trust.  Deadlines could be used for a number of 1
reasons, including but not limited to: 
• providing a cut-off point for matching donation schemes 
• increasing campaign urgency (such as with telethons or disaster relief campaigns) 
• giving a fundraising target, such as $10,000 by a certain date 
•  minimising the costs of running the campaign when there is a marginal cost associated with 
each additional day 
 See Appendix One for advertisements from these charities.1
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Crowd-funding websites such as Kickstarter and PledgeMe also use a deadline scheme where 
a target amount must be reached by a certain date for the donations to be successful.  2
Otherwise, the campaign ends and the donors retain their money. These fundraising methods 
are becoming popular as a way for charities to reach a wider, online audience. Through 
experimentally testing the effect of a deadline, I may also be able to draw conclusions about 
whether they are helpful or harmful for charities who already use them. While not specifically 
testing the scenarios listed above, this experiment may also reveal unintended side effects for 
charities who already use deadlines that should be considered when designing campaigns. 
An important place to begin is outlining precisely what inertia is. My interpretation of inertia 
is guided by Knowles and Servátka (2014). Many people may have good intentions when it 
comes to donating money, deciding at first to donate but then constantly postponing, never 
completing the process. We witness this type of behaviour in many other contexts, including 
school assignments and the completion of other tasks such as housework. People often 
postpone these tasks until they can no longer be avoided. Inertia is often confused with a bias 
for the status quo, but it differs in that the individual makes a conscious decision to complete 
an action first, rather than simply doing nothing (Knowles & Servátka, 2014). If inertia does 
affect charitable behaviour, then giving individuals more time to make their decision will 
reduce donations. 
In other areas we notice the impact of a deadline in helping individuals overcome inertia, such 
as with tertiary education and assignment due dates. While inertia may still be present 
initially, the presence of a deadline gives a concrete reason to stop postponing the task as to 
do so may result in negative consequences. A student may ignore an assignment until the 
deadline is looming, at which point the activity becomes a priority and the work must be 
completed. This shows that inertia and deadlines are strongly linked, which leads to the first 
research question addressed by this study. Does inertia affect charitable giving, and are 
deadlines an effective way to increase donations? In a charitable giving context, a deadline 
may also act as a cue that reminds people to donate, mitigating inertia for a number of 
individuals. This reminder could prompt additional donations that might not have occurred 
 These crowdfunding sites can be accessed at https://www.kickstarter.com/ and  2
   https://www.pledgeme.co.nz/ respectively.
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without the deadline, or it may serve to simply redistribute the donations throughout time. I 
will examine the donation distribution to observe whether this is the case. 
The second question addressed in this paper- whether the length of the deadline has an impact 
on donations to charity- is based on a theoretical model developed by Taubinsky (2014). This 
model shows that due to time-inconsistent preferences, people may respond differently to 
deadlines of various length. If this is the case in charitable giving, the length of a deadline 
may have a significant impact on the number of donations received, and also the amount of 
money donated overall. This is therefore an important issue for charities, who may wish to 
maximise revenue through effective campaign design. Overall, this study provides an 
investigation of charitable behaviour in the presence of a short, intermediate and long 
deadline to look at whether the length of a deadline can impact charitable revenue. This may 
have practical implications for charities when designing their campaigns. 
Experimental economics has been widely used to examine behaviour with regard to charitable 
giving. The majority of these studies use a dictator game with a charity as the recipient, first 
implemented by Eckel and Grossman (1996). Recent findings include increased altruism 
towards specific victims (Small, Lowenstein & Slovic, 2007), bias towards certain racial 
groups (Fong & Luttmer, 2011), the positive effect of matching donations (Rondeau & List, 
2008) and the benefits of positive framing (Brañas-Garza, 2007). This project augments 
previous research by looking at the presence of inertia and deadlines in charitable giving, an 
aspect that has remained largely untouched despite the immense interest in the economics of 
charity. Notably, participants in these studies decide whether to donate while in the laboratory 
and make the payment immediately if they choose to do so. There is therefore no possibility 
for inertia as the payment is made right away. In everyday life, an individual may make the 
decision to donate but then consistently postpone payment, resulting in inertia. An 
experimental set-up that allows for inertia more accurately simulates a real-life decision-
making process. 
To test the impact of deadlines on donations to charity I use a modified dictator game with a 
charity as the recipient, similar to many of the previous studies outlined above. In order to 
make the decision-making environment more realistic, I impose transaction costs through 
requiring participants to donate at a site other than the laboratory. This simulates a genuine 
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donation process as when giving to charity there is generally always a transaction cost such as 
posting a cheque or entering credit card details online. If there are no transaction costs to 
donating there would be no possibility for inertia, as the decision to donate could be actioned 
immediately without cost. In my experimental set-up, there is the possibility for inertia to 
emerge as participants can postpone their donation. They are making payments in their own 
time, rather than during the experiment session. 
The number of charities worldwide is increasing every year and as such, individual 
organisations are becoming progressively competitive over limited donations from 
consumers. They are having to become more efficient in their campaigns, revising collection 
methods so as to maximise the probability that they will be selected by any one donor. 
Experimental economics is embracing research on charitable donations and many scholars 
have examined the effects of various factors on altruism and giving. This leads to many 
practical conclusions that guide charities in constructing worthwhile campaigns. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section summarises further literature 
relating to inertia, deadlines and deadline length. Section three describes the experimental 
design employed in this study, and outlines the hypotheses to be tested. Section four presents 
the results of the experiment while section five concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) provide a convenient starting point for the investigation of 
intertemporal preferences: individuals have time-inconsistent preferences that affect decision-
making, and this affects behaviour over time. More specifically, the way in which people 
actually behave is often different to how they expect they will behave. O’Donoghue and 
Rabin divide individuals into naifs and sophisticates. A sophisticated agent knows exactly 
what the preferences of the future self will be and how they will differ from their current 
preferences, while a naive agent believes their future self will have identical preferences to the 
present self. This distinction is important in analysing theoretical models of choice over time, 
and this sets the framework for many analyses of intertemporal choice. 
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The first research question of this thesis concerns inertia in charitable giving. Intertemporal 
preferences are affected by inertia in areas such as retirement savings (Choi et al., 2002) and 
vaccination decisions (Leventhal, Singer & Jones, 1965). Both sets of authors examine inertia 
through asking subjects’ intentions and then comparing subsequent actions. In both cases, 
participants state that they intend to complete the specified action, but then never get around 
to doing so. Epley and Dunning (2000) find through experiments that people have immense 
difficulty predicting future behaviour accurately. Their subjects overestimate how likely they 
are to buy a daffodil in support of the American Cancer Society, or donate a portion of their 
experimental participation fee to charity.  
There are many everyday situations in which a deadline can be put in place to assist with 
problems arising from time-inconsistent preferences. König and Kleinmann (2005) produce a 
model in which the presence of a deadline increases the subjective importance of an activity, 
which leads to a long period of inactivity followed by a ‘deadline rush’. Ariely and 
Wertenbroch (2002) find that people self-impose deadlines in many situations, and use them 
effectively to complete tasks. Saez-Marti and Sjögren (2008) show that a distracted agent is 
more likely to complete a task by a specified deadline as he exercises increased precaution, 
starting the task earlier and thus finishing earlier. Deadlines not only improve completion 
rates but also individual performance on a specific task, and thus can improve the wellbeing 
of a procrastinator (Herweg & Müller, 2011). A rational decision-maker would not need such 
a tool, but in a world where self-control problems are present deadlines tend to be an effective 
way to overcome issues associated with time-inconsistent preferences (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 
2002). This study looks at whether there is an inertia problem in charitable giving, and 
whether this can be overcome by deadlines. 
There has been one significant study on inertia in charitable giving: Knowles and Servátka 
(2014), upon which the first research question of this thesis is based. While other authors use 
written intentions to study inertia, Knowles and Servátka look instead at whether giving 
people more time to donate reduces donations. This is to avoid a reduction in observed inertia 
through requiring subjects to state their intentions prior to acting, which may act as a written 
commitment to donating in the minds of some subjects. Knowles and Servátka find that most 
participants donate promptly. While giving people more time to donate does indeed reduce 
donations, consistent with an inertia effect, this is not statistically significant. However, it is 
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possible that the time horizons considered in this experiment were not long enough to observe 
an inertia effect. In addition to this, the presence of a deadline- whether this is one day or one 
week- may act as a reminder for donors and thus mitigate inertia. In this study, I introduce a 
longer time horizon through implementing no deadline at all. This gives the longest possible 
time horizon while also removing the presence of a deadline altogether, to alleviate the issue 
of a deadline acting as a potential reminder for subjects.  
While Knowles and Servátka (2014) do not find conclusive evidence of an inertia effect, they 
do note an interesting distributional effect in one of their treatments. This is akin to a deadline 
effect, in which participants “rush” before a deadline. Of the 23 subjects who donated in their 
one week treatment, thirteen donated on Day One, followed by three on Day Two, two on Day 
Three, none on Day Four and five on Day Five. This shows that while most people donate 
promptly, the next most common response was to donate on the day of the deadline. This 
raises the question: would these people have donated if the deadline did not exist? Answering 
this question is a key motivation for this research project. I extend the work done by Knowles 
and Servátka through addressing two connected questions arising from their analysis. Firstly, 
whether the deadlines considered were different enough to detect an inertia effect, and 
secondly whether the presence of a deadline prompted additional donations, or simply shifted 
the distribution of donations. This is done using an experimental treatment with no deadline. 
The second component of this thesis is looking at whether deadline length impacts donations 
to charity. This question is derived from a theoretical model developed by Taubinsky (2014), 
that uses deadlines to counter inertia arising from inattention. Taubinsky likens the inertia 
problem to a concept in psychology called ‘prospective memory,’ which he uses to provide 
the logic behind his model. Prospective memory describes everyday situations in which an 
individual decides to complete an action and fully intends to do so, but after forming this 
intention becomes engaged with other tasks and neglects to remember the deferred intention 
(Dismukes, 2012). There is nothing to explicitly prompt the agent to remember about the 
planned task. Instead, he must “remember to remember” (Dismukes, 2012: 215). This 
provides a striking example of how inertia might arise. 
Taubinsky (2014) proposes a decision environment in which there is a task that must be 
completed only once over the course of T periods. Each period the decision-maker either 
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completes the task, or does not. Additionally, each period contains a set of cues which may 
remind the decision-maker about the task he must perform. These cues either lead the 
decision-maker to either think about the task in a given period (attention) or forget about it 
(inattention). The stronger the cue, the more likely an individual is to remember about the 
task. One of the most salient cues is a deadline, so Taubinsky’s model includes a deadline in 
period T. The decision-maker learns about the task in t =0, at which point they are always 
attentive. They must complete the task at some point in time between t =1 and t =T. Taubinsky 
discusses three types of deadline in his model: short, intermediate, and long. He predicts the 
completion rates of sophisticated and naive individuals in each instance to theorise the impact 
of deadline length overall.  
In the presence of a long deadline, Taubinsky (2014) conjectures that the completion rate will 
decrease for naive decision-makers. This is generated by a decay in attention over time. A 
naive individual perceives a longer deadline as giving him more choice, however he neglects 
to account for the fact that the task is likely to leave his mind. The decision-maker believes he 
has more time to complete the task, and so he delays doing so. In postponing, he increases the 
chance that he will be inattentive later. Completion rates for naive individuals are therefore 
lower with longer deadlines. For sophisticated agents, it is less clear what will occur. 
However, as a sophisticated agent is aware of his future inattention, he may set reminders or 
create other cues. He can correctly anticipate his behaviour and so will account for his 
inattention when making a decision. Longer deadlines should not reduce completion rates 
compared to short deadlines, as over a greater time period there is more chance for the 
decision-maker to be attentive and thus complete the task. With short deadlines, the task 
remains at the top of the individual’s mind and so the majority of people who intend to 
complete the task will do so. 
Taubinsky (2014) predicts that the completion rate will be lowest when there is an 
intermediate deadline. As with a long deadline, individuals postpone the task and become 
inattentive. At a later point in time, there may be a cue in the environment that reminds the 
individual about the task. When there is a long deadline it is more likely that when the 
individual remembers the task, they will have not missed the deadline altogether. However, 
with an intermediate length the deadline may have passed and so despite remembering, the 
individual cannot complete the task. Thus, specifying an intermediate deadline will result in 
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lower completion rates than using either a short deadline or long deadline. This project will 
examine whether this theoretical model of deadline length applies to charitable donating by 
testing donation rates with a one week deadline, a two week deadline and an infinite deadline. 
Previous research reveals contradictory evidence regarding the impact of deadline length in 
other settings. In some contexts a longer deadline (or no deadline) may lead to increased 
response rates. According to the optimal stopping theory, a long time frame gives individuals 
a higher probability of finding a time to complete the task when the transaction costs and their 
opportunity cost of time are minimised (Chow, Robbins and Siegmund, 1971). There is also 
experimental data that shows an inverse relationship between deadline length and task 
completion rate. Firstly, Tversky and Shafir (1992) offer students five dollars if they return a 
completed questionnaire by a certain date. There are three treatments with varying deadline 
length: five days, three weeks, or no deadline. The respective completion rates are 60%, 42% 
and 25%, showing a significant decline in completion as the deadline length increases. Silk 
(2004) studies mail-in rebates and shows that although participants believed they were more 
likely to complete the rebate when there was a longer deadline, this was once again not the 
case. An inverse relationship between deadline length and completion rates is also found by 
Shu and Gneezy (2010) in the context of gift certificate redemption. Participants are given a 
gift certificate to purchase a pastry and a beverage at a local coffee shop, and these vouchers 
had either a three week deadline or a two month deadline. With the shorter deadline, 31% of 
participants redeemed their voucher. The redemption rate with the two month deadline is 
significantly lower, at just 6%. A survey sent to participants after the deadlines had expired 
revealed that most people continually believed they would redeem the voucher at a later date, 
until it was too late (Shu & Gneezy, 2010). In each of the cases above there are important 
outcomes achieved by varying the length of the deadline, such as fewer gift cards redeemed or 
fewer rebates claimed. While these effects might be beneficial for a company that is trying to 
improve revenue, a decrease in the donation rate would be detrimental for charities. My study 
investigates whether the length of a deadline can influence the number of donations made, 
thus impacting the total revenue of the charity. As outlined by previous experiments, the effect 
of deadline length can be significant and this may be an important policy decision for charities 
when designing fundraising campaigns. 
"11
While there has been a lot of research on the effect of deadlines in other situations, charitable 
giving differs from these activities for two main reasons. Firstly, an individual donor derives 
utility either from anticipating the recipient’s increase in utility, or the ‘warm glow’ from the 
act of giving (Andreoni, 1990). Secondly, it is not compulsory to donate and forgetting to do 
so holds little consequence for the donor. As with inertia, there has been minimal research on 
deadline length in charitable giving. Damgaard and Gravert (2014) investigate deadlines in 
charitable campaigns using a field experiment, in co-operation with a Danish charity. 
Fundraising emails and text messages are sent to a pool of previous donors, with deadlines of 
various length. They do not find significant evidence that deadlines increase subjects’ 
propensity to give, and conclude that changing the deadline length does not influence 
donations as individuals give either “now, or never.” However, Knowles et al. (2015) conduct 
a field experiment that uses three different deadlines to solicit donations: one week, one 
month, or no deadline. They find that donations are significantly lower with the one month 
deadline, which is in line with Taubinsky’s prediction that intermediate deadlines will have 
the lowest response rate.  
In sum, research so far has only been conducted in the field with contradictory results. This 
study aims to augment this research using a laboratory experiment to examine whether, once 
external factors are removed, there is an optimal deadline length for a charitable campaign. 
This will allow for greater control of other variables that can influence donation decisions, 
which may not be accounted for in the field. Knowles et al. (2015) acknowledge, as does 
Taubinsky (2014), that it is unclear what constitutes an intermediate deadline. Knowles et al. 
use a one month deadline and find significantly lower responses, and so I will use a two week 
deadline to see whether the same result applies at this length. 
3. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
The experiment took place in the New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory 
(NZEEL) at the University of Canterbury. Participants were randomly selected from the 
NZEEL database using the ORSEE recruitment system (Greiner, 2004). Two treatments were 
run for this project: a No Deadline treatment and a Two Week deadline treatment. Data from 
these treatments were compared to the NDW-2 treatment of Knowles and Servátka (2014), 
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which will be referred to in this study as the One Week deadline treatment. This treatment was 
also run at NZEEL, at an earlier date. 
A total of 88 participants took part in three sessions of the No Deadline treatment, with all 
sessions run on Monday 19 May, 2014. 
The Two Week treatment was run over five sessions in 2015. Participants were drawn from the 
NZEEL database, again using the ORSEE recruitment system. 53 subjects took part in three 
sessions run on Monday 16 March 2015, and in order to have a sample size similar to the 
previous treatments additional treatments were run on Monday 4 May, 2015 with 28 subjects 
participating. This brought the total sample size to 81 participants.  
These dates were selected as the sessions had to be run on a Monday to keep the deadline on 
the same day for all treatments, and the donating period could not fall within the university 
term break in case participants were away from campus. A two week deadline was chosen for 
the intermediate deadline length as when participants were given no deadline, the final 
donation was made on the 12th day. A two week deadline would give ten possible days to 
donate, excluding the weekend, so this was deemed to be an appropriate intermediate deadline 
length. 
3.1. Experimental Procedures 
In all treatments, subjects entered the laboratory and were paid a $10 show-up fee before 
being seated at partitioned cubicles. This ensured anonymity and eliminated social influence 
as participants were unable to see each other and therefore could not make judgements 
regarding the donation decisions of others. They also did not need to consider the social 
expectation of others around them and were free to make their decisions in private. After 
everyone was seated, decision-making instructions were handed out for the relevant treatment. 
These can be found in Appendix Two (No Deadline treatment) and Appendix Three (Two 
Week treatment). The instructions used by Knowles and Servátka (2014) for the One Week 
deadline treatment are also included, in Appendix Four.  
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The only difference in the instructions of the two treatments was to indicate how long subjects 
had to donate. They either had two weeks from the following day, or indefinitely. The 
instructions for the No Deadline treatment were read by Maroš Servátka, as he was the 
experimenter who ran the One Week treatment in the Knowles and Servátka (2014) study. This 
was done to maintain control of the data generating process and minimise the changes 
between these two treatments. A new experimenter may read the instructions in a manner that 
frames the task differently and thus influences the decisions of subjects, and this should be 
avoided when possible. However, I read the instructions for the Two Week treatment as Maroš 
was on sabbatical when these sessions were run. 
The experimental design used in both the No Deadline and the Two Week treatment was 
identical to that of the Knowles and Servátka (2014) One Week treatment. During the 
recruitment process, the sessions for both treatments were advertised as being a decision-
making task of thirty minutes. Participants were paid a $10 show-up fee, as well as an 
additional payment of $10 which they could use to donate to the selected charity, World 
Vision.  
The additional payment was a windfall gain as subjects did not have to work to earn it; it was 
simply handed to participants separately from the show-up fee. This design feature was 
implemented as there are several studies that show subjects are more generous in dictator 
games if their endowment is a windfall gain.  Incentivising donating helps to ensure the 3
treatment effects are detectable. Initially, Knowles and Servátka (2014) had participants fill 
out a survey to earn their endowment. They found that donations were very low, and this data 
was difficult to analyse. To further incentivise donating, I provided information about the 
charity who was receiving the funds, and what they would be doing with the money provided. 
Brañas-Garza (2006) finds that increasing the information available to participants will have a 
positive impact on donations. As such, participants were told that World Vision will direct 
donations from the experiment towards vaccinations to protect children in poor countries 
including Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda against a list of potentially fatal diseases. It has been 
organised with World Vision that the funds collected from the experiment will indeed go 
 See, for example, Cherry and Shogren (2008) and Carlsson, He and Martinsson (2013).3
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towards this specific cause. The intention here is to encourage donating through telling the 
participants where the money would be sent and who it would help. 
The experimental design for these treatments also incorporated a dollar-for-dollar subsidy on 
donations made by participants. This created an incentive for participants to donate within the 
experiment rather than sending it to World Vision themselves or donating to a different charity 
altogether (Knowles & Servátka, 2014). As the option of donating to charity was mentioned 
multiple times in the instructions, this action may be given increased weight in the mind of 
participants when considering what to do with their earnings. As many individuals have 
charities that they support due to personal preferences, it was important that they had an 
incentive to donate to World Vision within the experimental setting even if this is not their 
standard choice of charity. A matching subsidy lowers the cost of giving, meaning donations 
have a more significant monetary impact than the same amount donated elsewhere. This was 
intended to encourage subjects to donate within the experiment. 
The instructions in each treatment were divided into stages which described the various 
components of the experiment. Having been paid their show-up fee upon arrival, participants 
were given an additional $10 in a brown envelope consisting of one $5 note, two $2 coins, 
and a $1 coin. This allowed them to donate any amount from $0 to $10. Subjects were asked 
to confirm that their envelope did indeed contain $10 as they needed to sign a receipt for 
accounting purposes when they left the experiment. They were then told that their donations 
would be matched by the laboratory, where the money would be sent and how it would be 
used, and that their decision would remain completely anonymous. Finally, participants 
randomly selected a blue envelope from a box that was carried around the lab. These were 
marked with an alpha-numeric code to ensure anonymity, and participants were reassured that 
I would not know who had each code. This envelope contained a decision form, necessary for 
audit reasons, in which participants were to indicate how much they wish to donate, if any, 
and how much money this meant World Vision would receive after their donation was 
matched.  This also meant I could check that participants understood the nature of the 4
matching subsidy, and emphasised its presence one final time.  
 See Appendix Five for the decision form used in all treatments.4
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In the No Deadline treatment, participants were told that if they wanted to make a donation, 
they could place the money in a box located on campus “any time at [their] convenience over 
the coming months” in order to indicate that the box would be available indefinitely. In the 
Two Week treatment, participants were given a specific date by which they had to donate. 
Participants signed a receipt and left the laboratory one at a time to ensure they did not linger 
and communicate about their decisions at the conclusion of the session. Had this occurred it 
may have led to subjects’ decisions being influenced by other participants, as social influence 
can be significant especially when it comes to donating to charity (Shang & Croson, 2009). 
They were asked to leave immediately after signing the receipt and I regularly checked to 
make sure participants were not gathering outside the laboratory. 
Both of the treatments in this study, as well as the One Week treatment run by Knowles and 
Servátka (2014), were run under a double-blind social distance protocol. This is an 
experimental set-up in which the decisions and payoffs of subjects are not known by other 
subjects or the experimenter (Hoffman et al., 1994). The processes described above, including 
the cubicle arrangement and random envelope selection, are in place to make certain that I do 
not know who makes each decision, nor that participants know the decisions of others. 
Participants are also aware that I do not know what decision an individual makes. 
There were no major events identified between the One Week treatment of 2013, the No 
Deadline treatment of 2014 or the Two Week treatment of 2015 that would have had 
significant impact on subjects’ perceptions of World Vision or the specific purpose of the 
donations. This was strongly considered before deciding whether the three treatments could 
be compared. 
3.2. Hypotheses 
Hypothesis One: One Week > No Deadline  
The No Deadline treatment is compared to the One Week treatment of Knowles and Servátka 
(2014) in order to detect if inertia is present in charitable giving. If inertia affects donations to 
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charity, giving subjects more time to donate will reduce donations. The key variables are the 
number of donations and the average amount donated. 
Hypothesis Two: Two Week < One Week 
Hypothesis Three: Two Week < No Deadline  
This experiment also allows me to test the impact of deadline length in charitable giving, 
using the model outlined by Taubinsky (2014) as a framework. I compare a one week 
deadline, an infinite deadline and an intermediate deadline of two weeks. According to 
Taubinsky’s model, an intermediate deadline will have the lowest response rate. Thus, 
applying this to charitable giving, the prediction is that donations will be lower for the Two 
Week treatment than for both the One Week treatment and the No Deadline treatment.  
This occurs as with an intermediate deadline there is the chance for individuals to forget to 
complete the task, or procrastinate. While they eventually may remember, the deadline is 
more likely to have passed with an intermediate deadline than with a long deadline. With a 
short deadline there is less chance to procrastinate or forget, and so it is more likely that the 
individual will complete the task within the given timeframe. 
4. Results 
Summary statistics for the three treatments are presented in Table One. The median donation 
across all treatments was zero, with an average donation of $2.00 in the One Week treatment, 
$2.94 in the Two Week treatment and $1.80 in the No Deadline treatment. The summary 
statistics conditional on giving are also reported. The median donation conditional on giving 
is $10 for the One Week treatment, $10 for the Two Week treatment and $5 for the No 
Deadline treatment. The average donation conditional on giving is $7.57, $8.20 and $6.58 
respectively. 
One participant in both the No Deadline treatment and the Two Week treatment donated the 
full $20, comprised of the show-up fee and the additional $10 payment. As the instructions 
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asked subjects to donate only using the additional payment, I treat this as a $10 donation for 
the purpose of reporting results. The entire $20, as well as a matching subsidy of $20, was 
forwarded to World Vision. 
Table One:  
Summary Statistics 
4.1. Significance Tests 
Over all treatments, the response rate is 29.69%. The response rate for each treatment is given 
in Table Two. I analyse whether the differences between the three treatments are statistically 
significant using a two-sided Fisher’s exact test on STATA. I also test for the difference in 
average donation across treatments using a Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, with the null hypothesis 
of identical distributions. I look at both the overall data and the intensive margin, or the 
statistics conditional on donating. These results are summarised in Table Three. 
One Week Two Weeks No Deadline
All Data
Number of 
observations
87 81 88
Average donation 2.00 2.94 1.80
Median donation 0 0 0
Standard deviation 3.64 4.19 3.36
Intensive Margin 
(conditional on 
donating)
Number of positive 
donations
23
(26.4%)
29
(35.8%)
24
(27.3%)
Average donation 
conditional on giving
7.57 8.20 6.58
Median donation 
conditional on giving
10 10 5
Standard Deviation 
conditional on giving
2.79 2.32 3.15
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Table Two: 
Response Rates per Treatment 
Table Three: 
Significance Tests for Differences Across Treatments 
(p-values in parentheses) 
Result One: There is no evidence of an inertia problem in charitable giving, as the response 
rate in the No Deadline treatment is not significantly lower than that in the One Week 
treatment. 
The Fisher’s exact test for the difference in the number of donations made within the One 
Week and No Deadline treatments has a p-value of 1.00. This indicates that giving subjects 
more time to donate does not reduce donations. In fact, in this instance the response rate is 
higher for the No Deadline treatment (27.27% compared to 26.43%) though this difference is 
not significant. 
One Week Two Week No Deadline
Donations 23 29 24
Participants 87 81 88
Response Rate 26.43% 35.80% 27.27%
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test Fisher’s Exact Test for 
Proportion of Positive 
Donations
All Data
One Week v No Deadline 0.036 (0.971) (1.00)
One Week v Two Week 1.475 (0.140) (0.242)
Two Week v No Deadline -1.544 (0.116) (0.249)
Intensive Margin
(conditional on donating)
One Week v No Deadline 0.940 (0.347)
One Week v Two Week 1.008 (0.3136)
Two Week v No Deadline -2.056 (0.040)
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Across all data for these two treatments, there is no evidence for a difference in mean 
donation. Performing a Wilcoxon Rank Sum test gives a p-value of 0.971. This significance 
does not change across positive donations only, where the p-value is 0.347. 
Result Two: There is no evidence that the response rate with an intermediate two week 
deadline is lower than a short deadline of one week. Conversely, the response rate is higher in 
the Two Week treatment though this is not statistically significant. 
The p-value for the Fisher’s exact test in this instance is 0.242. While 26.43% of participants 
donated in the One Week treatment, 35.8% donated when they had two weeks to do so. The 
higher proportion in the Two Week treatment may be because with two weeks there is more 
flexibility for the donor: they have a wider range of times available, so they can donate when 
their opportunity cost of time is lowest. However, the higher proportion in the Two Week 
treatment is not statistically significant. 
Comparing the mean donations in the Two Week treatment and the One Week treatment also 
provides no statistically significant result. The significance test here has a marginally 
insignificant p-value of 0.140 across all data. Analysing the average donation conditional on 
giving has a p-value of 0.314. 
Result Three: There is no statistically significant evidence that there is a difference in the 
number of positive donations when comparing the Two Week treatment and the No Deadline 
treatment.  
While the Taubinsky (2014) model predicts that an intermediate deadline will have a lower 
response rate than a long deadline, this study finds no evidence to support this claim within a 
charitable giving context. The Fisher’s exact test in this case has a p-value of 0.249.  
The summary statistics show the largest nominal difference between average donations occurs 
between the Two Week treatment and the No Deadline treatment. The Wilcoxon Rank Sum 
test using all data again has a marginally insignificant p-value of 0.116, and conditional on 
donating this becomes significant with a p-value of 0.040. It is possible that the deadline 
creates a sense of urgency that increases the average donation made by participants, but as 
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this result did not carry through to a significant level with the one week deadline, further 
research would be needed to analyse this. 
It may be that a two week deadline is not long enough to be deemed ‘intermediate’ according 
to Taubinsky’s model; he states it is difficult to predict when the lower response rate might 
come into effect. Knowles et al. (2015) find significantly lower donations with their one 
month treatment, compared to both a one week deadline and no deadline. A valuable 
extension of my study would be to run a One Month treatment under the same conditions, to 
try and replicate the field result of Knowles et al. (2015) in the laboratory. If the result holds, 
it could be concluded that two weeks is actually still a ‘short’ deadline, and that the lower 
response rate does occur for intermediate deadlines of approximately one month. 
4.2 Donation Distribution 
I discretely checked the donation box after 5pm each day, to ensure that no participants would 
be attempting to donate while I was there in case this altered their decisions. I cleared the 
donations daily for either the period of the specified deadline or, in the case of the No 
Deadline treatment, until it appeared that there would be no further donations. Beyond this, I 
checked the donation box once a week to ensure there were no late donations. This allowed 
me to accurately follow the distribution of donations over time to see if there were any clear 
behavioural changes influenced by the deadline. The number of donations per day is shown 
for each treatment: One Week in Figure One, Two Week in Figure Two and No Deadline in 
Figure Three. 
As there was no deadline for one treatment, participants from these sessions are still able to 
donate if they wish. However, no donation has been made since June 5, 2014. This was the 
12th day of the donation period. There have been no late donations in either the One Week 
treatment or the Two Week treatment to date. 
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Figure One:  
Donation Distribution in the One Week treatment 
Figure Two: 
Donation Distribution in the Two Week treatment 
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Figure Three: 
Donation Distribution in the No Deadline treatment 
 
The ‘deadline rush’ distribution noted by Knowles and Servátka (2014) is shown as the One 
Week treatment of this study. Most people donate on the first day (56.5% of donors), but the 
next most common result was to donate on the day of the deadline (21.7% of donors). This 
was Day Five of the donation period. In the No Deadline treatment there were no donations 
on this day, and in the Two Week treatment there was just one. This suggests that perhaps the 
deadline did act as a cue to remind people to donate within the One Week treatment, however 
as donations overall are not significantly higher it appears that this is just a change in the 
distribution. Those who would have donated later instead just donated within the time frame 
specified, rather than new donors being encouraged to donate by the presence of a deadline. 
The lack of a uniform distribution over all treatments indicates that donation behaviour is not 
consistent with the optimal stopping model, in which a rational individual would make their 
donation when their expected transaction cost is minimised. 
Result Four: Donors tend to donate promptly, rather than postponing payment or waiting for 
the deadline. 
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Table Four: 
Proportion of Prompt Donations 
In all treatments, the most common response is to donate on the first possible day: in the One 
Week treatment 56.5% of those who donate do so on Day One, for the Two Week treatment 
this figure is 41.37% and for the No Deadline treatment it is 45.83%. This prompt behaviour 
is particularly notable if this is extended to the proportion that donates in the first three days: 
78.26% of donors in the One Week treatment, 79.31% in the Two Week treatment and 83.33% 
when there was no deadline specified. These results are summarised in Table Four. Generally, 
there is then a steady decline with donations dropping on each subsequent day of the donation 
period and one or two late donations. This reinforces the “now or never” effect found by 
Damgaard and Gravert (2014). It may be that these prompt donors are ‘sophisticates’ 
according to the definition of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999); they are aware that if they do 
postpone payment once, they will forget and never complete their donation. These participants 
know that if they do not donate while the decision is at the top of their mind, they will become 
inattentive and ultimately forget to complete their donation. 
4.3 Policy Implications 
This study finds no evidence that deadlines increase donations to charity, in terms of the 
number of donations or the average amount donated. The only significant result is a higher 
average donation conditional on donating when comparing the Two Week treatment and the 
No Deadline treatment, which may suggest that a deadline conveys urgency and so 
encourages subjects to donate more. While it appears that deadlines are not a useful tool for 
charities, this research could indicate that should a charity require a deadline for some reason 
(say, they are raising funds for a specific event, or they want to minimise the number of days 
that the campaign runs to keep costs to a minimum), imposing one will not hinder their 
campaign. There is no evidence that results are significantly lower when a deadline is used, 
compared to when no deadline is specified. However, it is important to note that while my 
One Week Two Weeks No Deadline
First Day 56.5% 41.37% 45.83%
Initial Three Days 78.26% 79.31% 83.33%
"24
results suggest an equivalence of donation campaigns with or without deadlines, I am unable 
to categorically accept the hypothesis that the two scenarios are the same. Based on the data in 
this project, I can only fail to reject this hypothesis. Donors who were intending to donate 
appear to simply shift their decision-making forward to fit within the deadline, rather than 
deciding not to donate at all. A deadline may therefore still be a useful tool to help charities 
raise the same funds sooner, rather than later. 
Some of the donors who waited and donated later in the period also appeared to change their 
mind regarding how much they wanted to donate. More specifically, they decided in the 
interim that they wanted to spend some or all of the money, rather than donate it. For 
example, one participant in the Two Week treatment handed in a donation form where the 
amount donated had been changed from $10 to $0, and there was no money in the envelope. 
This was received on Day Eight of the donation period, and so it appears that while the 
participant had previously intended to donate, other expenses arose which led him to change 
his mind. In the No Deadline treatment, the final donation was received on Day 12, in a 
different envelope than the one supplied.  Written on the envelope was a note: “Sorry, I 5
needed to use the money (twice) and had to reopen the blue envelope (twice) so it got a bit 
ripped and stuff. I copied the code onto this one. P.S. That’s why it’s a $10 note. Hope that’s 
okay.” This may be important for charities to note: given that most people donate promptly, 
and a portion of those who postpone then change their minds, campaigns should be designed 
so as to solicit immediate donations with minimal time for donors to alter their decisions. 
Increasing the urgency of the request or sending reminders to donate may be options to ensure 
people do not forget to donate before their situation changes. However, further research would 
be needed to confirm the effect of these methods. 
5. Conclusion 
Deadlines are used in a number of contexts to maximise completion rates by reducing inertia 
and inattention. This study looks at whether deadlines are an effective tool for charities by 
examining the number of donations, mean donation and distribution of donations with three 
 See Appendix Six for a scanned copy of these decision forms.5
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different deadlines: a one week deadline, a two week deadline and an infinite deadline. 
Overall this gives a thorough investigation into deadlines and deadline length in charitable 
giving. 
Two papers guided this study. Firstly, an empirical examination of inertia and transaction 
costs in charitable giving by Knowles and Servátka (2014) left some unanswered questions 
surrounding deadline behaviour in a charitable giving context. Secondly, Taubinsky (2014) 
develops a theoretical model for task completion with deadlines of various length, in which 
deadlines of intermediate length result in significantly lower completion rates. This led to two 
key research questions: is there an inertia problem in charitable giving that might be solved by 
deadlines, and does the length of a deadline matter? While these issues have been considered 
in many contexts before, the literature on both inertia and deadlines in charitable giving is 
very limited. This thesis adds to existing charitable behaviour research by testing the effects 
of deadlines in the laboratory, allowing for increased control over the data generating process, 
and with a greater range of deadlines including ‘no deadline.’  
I find no significant evidence of an inertia effect in charitable giving. If donors suffered from 
inertia, providing more time to donate would reduce donations. Through comparing data from 
the One Week treatment and the No Deadline treatment, where people had the longest possible 
amount of time to donate, it appears that this is not the case. In fact, the response rate with no 
deadline is higher than with a one week deadline, though this difference is not significant. 
Further, my results suggest that donations are not impacted by deadline length. There is no 
evidence to support Taubinsky’s (2014) claim that intermediate deadlines have a lower 
response rate. Alternatively, it may be that a two week deadline cannot be classed as 
‘intermediate’ in length as Knowles et al. (2015) do find significantly lower donations with a 
one month deadline. While conditional on donating there is a significantly higher average 
donation with a two week deadline compared to no deadline at all, this result does not occur 
with a one week deadline. This result may suggest that adding a deadline increases the 
perceived urgency for those who are already inclined to donate, however further research 
would be needed to confirm this since it did not occur in the other deadline treatment. 
Overall, the presence of a deadline does not appear to help a charity increase its revenue, but 
nor does it seem to hinder fundraising. If a charity has limited time or budget, a deadline may 
"26
be a useful tool for keeping a campaign short, yet effective. However, if there is no need to 
restrict the donation period, this study suggests that charities should not impose deadlines on 
their campaigns, instead allowing individuals to donate when it is most convenient for them. 
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Appendix One: Examples of charities using deadlines 
 
Image One: PETA Campaign using a deadline to provide a target and signal the end of a 
matching donation scheme.   6
Text reads: “Please give right now to have your gift matched. October 31 is the last day of the 
challenge!” and 
“Please donate before the month ends to help us reach this critically important goal!” 
 Source: http://www2.peta.org/site/MessageViewer?\em_id=108648.0&amp;dlv_id=159251&printer_friendly=16
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Trouble viewing this message? View this message online. > (http://www2.peta.org/site/R?
i=m7q5Q6KAE4eEnryIrzZ43g)
(http://www2.peta.org/site/R?i=2fkBcOsrRDl2mva4u1zMzQ)
(http://www2.peta.org/site/R?
i=89I7bEEBKfLUCr_59­4Q4Q) Dear Friend,
There are just hours left for you to help!
The last day of PETA's Global "Stop Animal Tests"
Challenge is October 31, and we need your help to
reach our $250,000 online goal—we're still $40,000
away! Please donate before the month ends to
help us reach this critically important goal!
(http://www2.peta.org/site/R?
i=YWRYev7IDH7I_6x­IjBZVA)
Your gift will help PETA save more animals like Libby,
who had been living in an animal experimentation
hellhole until our undercover investigator exposed the
laboratory's cruel practices and helped bring about the
release of this sweet dog. Thanks to PETA's
investigation, the laboratory where she was held
captive shut its doors and the animals released found
real homes!
Donate right now to support PETA's work to
expose abuse behind laboratory doors and save
animals from terrible experiments, and your
gift will be DOUBLED!
(http://www2.peta.org/site/R?
i=_SCeP8ZWVu7dGkvjLytaIQ)
Each year, millions of animals, including cats, goats,
mice, monkeys, and other sensitive animals just like Libby, face painful—and often deadly—
experiments in laboratories or military training exercises. PETA's dedicated team of researchers,
undercover investigators, and scientists work tirelessly to stop experiments on animals and to
prevent them from ever happening at all. Your gift to PETA's Global "Stop Animal Tests"
Challenge (http://www2.peta.org/site/R?i=kjt4XIM0NU9zenXIPIYnHg) right now
may be your best chance to help make that happen, as it will be matched—dollar for dollar—by a
group of dedicated PETA donors. But only gifts toward our online goal before the end of this
month will be matched, so please make your donation right now!
(http://www2.peta.org/site/R?i=PditOq_aigxpg_IkhVwVLw)
We may never know what cruel experiments Libby was subjected to before being adopted by a
loving guardian, but we do know that each year, countless animals just like her are killed in
deadly tests that could easily be replaced by more effective non­animal methods. For more than
three decades, we've been winning important victories for animals in laboratories and stopping
tests on animals by corporations, governments, and universities. Your support today will help
PETA save more animals like Libby from the misery of animal testing.
We only have until October 31 to meet our challenge goal and double the funds to help as many
animals in laboratories as possible. Don't miss this chance to make a difference for
animals before the online matching challenge ends! (http://www2.peta.org/site/R?
i=qXJhZLIcW2L_02JL7BSHSg)
Thank you for all that you do for animals in laboratories who so desperately need our help.
Kind regards,
Ingrid E. Newkirk
President
P.S. This is your last chance to donate before the October 31 deadline in order to help PETA
reach this important online goal. Please donate right now!
(http://www2.peta.org/site/R?i=dseINcBbpZ9A­NQ5ISFiIA)
 Image Two: PledgeMe campaign by FESTA, part of the Christchurch Transitional 
Architecture Trust, a registered New Zealand charity.   
Donations will only be confirmed if the target is reached by a deadline, which is emphasised 
by ‘time left’ and the bold deadline of 3pm on 09/10/2014.  7
 Source: https://www.pledgeme.co.nz/projects/25887
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Appendix Two: Instructions, No Deadline treatment 
Instructions: Decision-making task 
Thank you for participating in this research project, which should take no longer than 30 
minutes. 
Show up fee 
You have all received your $10 show up fee when you arrived at the lab. We will get you to 
sign a receipt for this before you leave. 
Decision-making task 
We are now going to undertake the decision making task. We ask that you listen quietly to the 
following instructions and do not speak until you have left the lab. If you have a question after 
we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach you 
and answer your question in private. 
Donation 
We will shortly hand out to you a brown envelope containing $10. This money is being given 
to you in addition to your $10 show up fee.  You can either keep this additional $10 for 
yourself, or donate some, or all, of it to World Vision New Zealand, who are a registered 
charity doing development work in poor countries overseas. Any money you choose to donate 
to World Vision will be matched by us dollar for dollar (in other words, we will double your 
donation) and we will forward all money directly to World Vision. World Vision will use this 
money to provide vaccinations to protect children in poor countries (e.g. in African countries 
like Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) against measles, whooping cough, diphtheria, hepatitis, 
polio and tetanus. These diseases cause many children to die every year, but are easily 
preventable. The brown envelope contains a $5 note, two $2 coins and a $1 coin, so it is 
possible to donate any whole dollar amount, between $0 and $10 to World Vision. You are 
under no obligation to donate any money to World Vision unless you wish to do so.  
Anonymity 
Your decision is completely anonymous. This task is designed in such a way that no-one will 
ever know how much any individual has given. Your privacy is guaranteed because neither your 
name nor your student ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions. The only 
identifying mark in all records will be the alpha-numeric code on your form and envelope. We 
have no way of knowing who has been assigned which code.  
Blue envelope 
We are also going to hand out a blue envelope containing a blue form with a space to indicate 
how much money,  if any, you wish to give to World Vision, and how much money this means 
World Vision will receive once we have matched your donation dollar for dollar. For audit 
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reasons, we are only able to match any donation you make dollar for dollar if we have a 
written record of what has been donated, hence the need for you to complete this form. 
If you wish to make a donation put the money you wish to donate in the blue envelope and 
place this envelope in the box labelled “ECON” located on the ground floor in the main 
entrance of the Psychology building (the car park side, not the Cafe 101 side.) If you wish to 
make a donation, you can donate any time at your convenience over the coming months 
starting from tomorrow, Tuesday 20th May at 8am. Please note that you may place the 
envelope in the box any workday as the building will be closed on Saturday and Sunday. 
There is a map in the blue envelope showing the location of the Psychology Building.  
Remember if you choose to make a donation, you need to place the blue envelope, containing 
your donation and the completed blue form, in the red box in the Psychology Building any 
time over the coming months from tomorrow, Tuesday 20th May at 8am. 
Receipt 
At the end of the session we will ask you one at a time to come up to the room at the back of 
the lab and sign a form acknowledging that you were paid $20 (the $10 show up fee and the 
additional $10). When you have done this, please leave the lab and do not wait around 
outside.  Remember if you wish to make a donation you can do this starting from 8am 
tomorrow. Thank you once more for taking part in our study.  
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Appendix Three: Instructions, Two Week treatment 
Instructions: Decision-making task 
Thank you for participating in this research project, which should take no longer than 30 
minutes. 
Show up fee 
You have all received your $10 show up fee when you arrived at the lab. We will get you to 
sign a receipt for this before you leave. 
Decision-making task  
We are now going to undertake the decision making task. We ask that you listen quietly to the 
following instructions and do not speak until you have left the lab. If you have a question after 
we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach 
you and answer your question in private. 
Donation  
We will shortly hand out to you a brown envelope containing $10. This money is being given 
to you in addition to your $10 show up fee. You can either keep this additional $10 for 
yourself, or donate some, or all, of it to World Vision New Zealand, who are a registered 
charity doing development work in poor countries overseas. Any money you choose to donate 
to World Vision will be matched by us dollar for dollar (in other words, we will double your 
donation) and we will forward all money directly to World Vision. World Vision will use this 
money to provide vaccinations to protect children in poor countries (e.g. in African countries 
like Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) against measles, whooping cough, diphtheria, hepatitis, 
polio and tetanus. These diseases cause many children to die every year, but are easily 
preventable. The brown envelope contains a $5 note, two $2 coins and a $1 coin, so it is 
possible to donate any whole dollar amount, between $0 and $10 to World Vision. You are 
under no obligation to donate any money to World Vision unless you wish to do so. 
Anonymity 
Your decision is completely anonymous. This task is designed in such a way that no-one will 
ever know how much any individual has given. Your privacy is guaranteed because neither 
your name nor your student ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions. 
The only identifying mark in all records will be the alpha-numeric code on your form and 
envelope. We have no way of knowing who has been assigned which code. 
Blue envelope 
We are also going to hand out a blue envelope containing a blue form with a space to indicate 
how much money, if any, you wish to give to World Vision, and how much money this means 
World Vision will receive once we have matched your donation dollar for dollar. For audit 
reasons, we are only able to match any donation you make dollar for dollar if we have a 
written record of what has been donated, hence the need for you to complete this form. 
If you wish to make a donation put the money you wish to donate in the blue envelope and 
place this envelope in the box labelled “ECON” located on the ground floor in the main 
entrance of the Psychology building (the car park side, not the Cafe 101 side.) You will have 
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from 8am tomorrow ([date]) until 5pm [deadline date] to place the envelope in the box if you 
wish to make a donation. Please note that you may place the envelope in the box any workday 
as the building will closed on Saturday and Sunday. Note that donations will only be matched 
dollar for dollar if placed in the box between 8am and 5pm from tomorrow for the next two 
weeks. There is a map in the blue envelope showing the location of the Psychology Building. 
Remember if you choose to make a donation, you need to place the blue envelope, containing 
your donation and the completed blue form, in the red box in the Psychology Building 
between 8am and 5pm from tomorrow [date] until [deadline date]. 
Receipt 
At the end of the session we will ask you one at a time to come up to the room at the back of 
the lab and sign a form acknowledging that you were paid $20 (the $10 show up fee and the 
additional $10). When you have done this, please leave the lab and do not wait around 
outside. Remember if you wish to make a donation you can do this between 8am and 5pm 
from tomorrow until [deadline date]. Thank you once more for taking part in our study. 
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Appendix Four: Instructions, One Week treatment 
Instructions: Decision-making task 
Thank you for participating in this research project, which should take no longer than 30 
minutes. 
Show up fee 
You have all received your $10 show up fee when you arrived at the lab. We will get you to 
sign a receipt for this before you leave. 
Decision-making task  
We are now going to undertake the decision making task. We ask that you listen quietly to the 
following instructions and do not speak until you have left the lab. If you have a question after 
we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach 
you and answer your question in private. 
Donation  
We will shortly hand out to you a brown envelope containing $10. This money is being given 
to you in addition to your $10 show up fee. You can either keep this additional $10 for 
yourself, or donate some, or all, of it to World Vision New Zealand, who are a registered 
charity doing development work in poor countries overseas. Any money you choose to donate 
to World Vision will be matched by us dollar for dollar (in other words, we will double your 
donation) and we will forward all money directly to World Vision. World Vision will use this 
money to provide vaccinations to protect children in poor countries (e.g. in African countries 
like Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) against measles, whooping cough, diphtheria, hepatitis, 
polio and tetanus. These diseases cause many children to die every year, but are easily 
preventable. The brown envelope contains a $5 note, two $2 coins and a $1 coin, so it is 
possible to donate any whole dollar amount, between $0 and $10 to World Vision. You are 
under no obligation to donate any money to World Vision unless you wish to do so. 
Anonymity 
Your decision is completely anonymous. This task is designed in such a way that no-one will 
ever know how much any individual has given. Your privacy is guaranteed because neither 
your name nor your student ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions. 
The only identifying mark in all records will be the alpha-numeric code on your form and 
envelope. We have no way of knowing who has been assigned which code. 
Blue envelope 
We are also going to hand out a blue envelope containing a blue form with a space to indicate 
how much money, if any, you wish to give to World Vision, and how much money this means 
World Vision will receive once we have matched your donation dollar for dollar. For audit 
reasons, we are only able to match any donation you make dollar for dollar if we have a 
written record of what has been donated, hence the need for you to complete this form. 
If you wish to make a donation put the money you wish to donate in the blue envelope and 
place this envelope in the box labelled “ECON” located on the ground floor in the main 
entrance of the Psychology building (the car park side, not the Cafe 101 side.) You will have 
from 8am tomorrow ([insert day of week and date]) until 5pm [insert day of week and date] to 
place the envelope in the box if you wish to make a donation. Please note that you may place 
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the envelope in the box any workday as the building will closed on Saturday and Sunday. 
Note that donations will only be matched dollar for dollar if placed in the box between 8am 
and 5pm from tomorrow for the next week. There is a map in the blue envelope showing the 
location of the Psychology Building. 
Remember if you choose to make a donation, you need to place the blue envelope, containing 
your donation and the completed blue form, in the red box in the Psychology Building 
between 8am and 5pm from tomorrow ([insert day of week and date]) until [insert day of 
week and date]. 
Receipt 
At the end of the session we will ask you one at a time to come up to the room at the back of 
the lab and sign a form acknowledging that you were paid $20 (the $10 show up fee and the 
additional $10). When you have done this, please leave the lab and do not wait around 
outside. Remember if you wish to make a donation you can do this between 8am and 5pm 
from tomorrow until [insert day of week] next week. Thank you once more for taking part in 
our study. 
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Appendix Five: Decision form for all treatments 
We would like to give you the opportunity to donate all or some of your additional payment of 
$10, if you wish, to World Vision New Zealand, who are a registered charity doing 
development work in poor countries overseas. Any money you choose to donate to World 
Vision will be matched by us dollar for dollar (in other words, we will double your donation) 
and we will forward all money directly to World Vision. World Vision will use this money to 
provide vaccinations to protect children in poor countries (e.g. in African countries like 
Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) against measles, whooping cough, diphtheria, hepatitis, polio 
and tetanus. These diseases cause many children to die every year, but are easily preventable. 
I wish to donate $________ to World Vision. Given that the researchers will match my 
donation dollar for dollar, this means World Vision will receive $________ as a result of my 
donation. 
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Appendix Six: Altered decision forms 
Top form: Subject changed “I wish to donate $10” to “I wish to donate $0”. This was 
submitted on Day Eight of the Two Week treatment, but was not included as a data point as it 
was a non-donation. 
Bottom envelope, text reads: “Sorry, I needed to use the money (twice) and had to reopen the 
blue envelope (twice) so it got a bit ripped and stuff. I copied the code onto this one. PS. 
That’s why it’s a $10 note. Hope that’s okay.”
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We would like to give you the opportunity to donate all or some of your additional payment of $10, if
you wish, to World l/ision New Zealand, who are a registered charity doing development work in poor
countries overseas. Any money you choose to donate to World Vision will be matched by us dollar for
dollar (in other words, we will double your donation) and we will forward all money directly to World
Yision" World Vision will use this money to provide vaccinations to protect children in poor countries
(e.g. in African countries like Rwanda,Tanzania and Uganda) against measles, whooping cough,
diphtheria, hepatitis, polio and tetanus. These diseases cause many children to die every year, but are
easily preventable.
I wish to donate $ "@ O to World Vision. Given that the researchers will match my donation dollar
fordollar, this*"-anslLorldVisionwillreceive 8 W C asaresultofmydonation.
